Two Into One: The Politics and Processes of National Legislative Cameral Change by Lawrence D Longley

Author:Lawrence D Longley [Longley, Lawrence D]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780367214944
Google: FLW-zQEACAAJ
Goodreads: 54996492
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2020-09-30T00:00:00+00:00

The Case for Maintaining Bicameralism

The thrust of Liberal J. P. Stensballe's thesis was that the Constitutional Commission's 1953 proposals did not adequately protect legislative minorities, and thus created an inherently weak form of unicameralism.87 In his view, there were insufficient obstacles preventing a simple majority from taking precipitate legislative action in such vital areas as the economy, employment, taxation, church-state relations, and education. The only protection against rash decisions, Stensballe observed, was the referendum provision written into Article 42--and even this safeguard did not apply to a wide range of financial policy. Stensballe argued, very much in line with Communist commission member Aksel Larsen, that the referendum would not be employed as intended, to protect the position of adversely affected minorities, since the substantial referendum vote needed would make defeat of a measure unlikely, and this in turn would deter use of the procedure.

Stensballe argued that in a two-chamber system, in contrast, there is a mutually fertile interaction between parliament and the corporate sector. Trade unions, employers' organizations, and other key economic actors, he contended, have an invaluable opportunity to acquaint themselves with, and in turn to exert a constructive influence on, proposals as they are transmitted from the one chamber to the other. This opportunity would be lost in a unicameral system because strategic policy decisions would be taken in the secrecy of a standing committee.

Stensballe was plainly enamored of the Finnish legislative process. He claimed that this was the only unicameral assembly in Western Europe to provide adequate protection for legislative minorities. To be sure, Stensballe painted a rather rose-colored picture of the second-chamber function of the Finnish Grand Committee (suuri valiokunta), ignoring the extent to which this unique feature had become party-politicized. Nonetheless, he did not advocate the wholesale adoption in Denmark of the processes used to protect the rights of legislative minorities in Finland. Instead, he stood the argument on its head by citing the Finnish case to justify the status quo ante of a bicameral assembly. Would a two-chamber system be any more complicated to operate than unicameralism with a Finnish-style web of minority safeguards, he asked? His conclusion was that an indissoluble Landsting directly chosen by electors (principally local councillors), with half the members being selected every four years for eight-year terms--together with the referendum provision of Article 42--would provide the best protection in Denmark against executive folly.

A more exhaustive defence of legislative bicameralism was contained in statements to the Constitutional Commission from constitutional experts Poul Andersen, Jens Møller, and Alf Ross.88 First, it was observed that in the post-war years bicameralism continued to be the dominant legislative arrangement in the Western world, and that the incidence of single-chamber national systems had not increased. Significantly, it was noted, a bicameral National Assembly had been reintroduced in France at the beginning of the Fourth Republic, following the rejection of a constitutional proposal containing a single-chamber option. This ballot, on May 5, 1946, marked the first time in French history that the electorate had rejected a referendum proposal.

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